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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Danny Richard Stroud appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 to correct what is allegedly an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court
lost its jurisdiction over him in 2014.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Danny Richard Stroud pled guilty to driving under the influence and aggravated assault in
2008. (R., pp.77-86.) On December 4, 2008, the district court withheld judgment and ordered
five years of probation on the aggravated assault conviction. (R., pp.98-102.) Less than five
years later, in May of 2013, the district court issued a bench warrant on a report of probation
violations (R., pp.151-52), which violations Stroud later admitted (R., p.161). In July of 2013,
the district court revoked Stroud’s probation and imposed a sentence of five years with three
years fixed, but retained its jurisdiction. (R., pp.164-67.) At the end of the period of retained
jurisdiction, in January of 2014, the district court suspended Stroud’s sentence and again ordered
a period of five years of probation, backdated to July 24, 2013. (R., pp.179-83.) Less than five
years later, in January of 2018, Stroud again admitted to violating his probation. (R., pp.230-34,
239.) In April of the same year, the district court suspended his sentence and ordered probation
for a period of four years to commence on April 20, 2018. (R., pp.245-48. 1)
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As Stroud notes, the record reflects some uncertainty regarding the period of probation ordered
at this stage. (Appellant’s brief, p.2 n.2.) Citing the register of actions and an audio recording
that is not in the record on appeal, the state claimed below that the period of probation was in fact
three years, not the four years reflected in the court’s order. (R., p.281 n.2.) Stroud is not
claiming that as an issue on appeal, however. (Appellant’s brief, p.2 n.2.)
1

In July of 2019, Stroud filed a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to correct an
allegedly illegal sentence. (R., pp.270-72.) He argued that the maximum period of probation for
a felony is the maximum period for which the defendant might have been incarcerated for that
felony, which is five years for aggravated assault; that he “was placed on probation on December
3, 2008, for the maximum period of 5 years”; and that, including periods of tolling associated
with the adjudication of his probation violations, that period “expired on or about November 25,
2014.” (R., pp.271-72.) The district court rejected that argument, concluding that Stroud’s total
time on probation could lawfully exceed five years where, as here, the court initially withheld
judgment and then imposed and subsequently suspended his sentence in favor of a new period of
probation. (R., pp.291-94. 2) Stroud timely appealed. (R., pp.296-98.)

2

The district court reduced the period of probation in light of the credit for time served to which
Stroud was entitled. (R., p.294.)
2

ISSUE
Stroud states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Stroud’s motion for [sic] correct an
illegal sentence?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Stroud failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion to correct an
allegedly illegal sentence?
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ARGUMENT
Stroud Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion Under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Stroud argues that the district court lost jurisdiction over him in November of

2014 because the maximum period of probation for an aggravated assault conviction is five years
and, as of November 25, 2014, he spent five years on probation for that offense. (Appellant’s
brief, p.8. 3) In making that argument, Stroud acknowledges but asks this Court to disregard the
fact that “the district court revoked his withheld judgment in 2013”―before his five year period
of probation expired―and, as a result, “the court could in 2013 pronounce any sentence it could
originally have pronounced.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) According to Stroud, despite that fact, the
“aggregate” time that he spent on probation, including the period that he was on probation while
judgment was withheld and the period he was on probation after the court entered judgment and
suspended his sentence, could still not exceed five years. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
That view is inconsistent with the statutory language and the relevant case law. When the
district court revoked his probation and entered judgment, the court was permitted both to
impose any sentence that it could initially have imposed―including the maximum sentence of
five years―and to suspend that sentence in favor of a new period of probation of the same
length. The two separate periods of probation―first, while judgment was withheld and, second,
after the district court entered judgment and suspended Stroud’s sentence, which periods of
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After his sentencing in December of 2008, five years would have passed in December of 2013.
Stroud calculates November 25, 2014, as the relevant date because of his concession that “his
probationary period was tolled while the state was seeking probation violations from May 21,
2013 to January 29, 2014, and January 8, 2018 to April 20, 2018, which was a period of 357
days.” (Appellant’s brief, p.2 n.1.)
4

probation were separated by a year of incarceration while Stroud was on retained
jurisdiction―do not aggregate to create a single, unlawful period of probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[W]hether a sentence is illegal or whether it was imposed in an illegal manner is a

question of law, over which we exercise free review.” State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218
P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798,
102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App.
2004).

C.

The District Court Was Not Deprived Of Jurisdiction In 2014
In 2008, when Stroud was initially sentenced, the district court withheld judgment and

imposed a five year period of probation. (R., pp.98-102.) Idaho Code § 19-2601(3) permits a
sentencing court to “[w]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and
may place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and
appropriate.” The same statute provides that, for a felony, “the period of probation may be for a
period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have been
imprisoned.” I.C. § 19-2601(7). Likewise, Idaho Code § 20-222(1) states:
The period of probation or suspension of sentence shall be fixed by the court and
may at any time be extended or terminated by the court. Such period with any
extension thereof shall not exceed the maximum period for which the defendant
might have been imprisoned.
I.C. § 20-222(1); see also State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815, 932 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App.
1997). “[A] court may at any time extend a period of probation so long as the probationary
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period does not exceed the maximum period for which the defendant might have been
imprisoned.” State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 5, 909 P.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing I.C.
§ 20-222). Thus, when the district court withheld judgment and imposed probation in 2008, the
period of probation―including any extension of that period―could not exceed five years. See
I.C. § 18-906 (providing that the maximum period of imprisonment for aggravated assault is five
years).

The five years of probation ordered by the court in 2008 was thus a proper, and

maximum, period of probation.
When Stroud violated his probation in 2013, the district court was then permitted to
revoke Stroud’s probation, enter judgment, and impose any sentence that it could have imposed
initially. “When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of
probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could
originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke
probation.” I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added); see also I.C. § 20-222(2) (upon probation violation
court “may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which originally might
have been imposed at the time of conviction”). “[W]hen a withheld judgment is granted the trial
court may revoke the probation and impose any sentence which originally might have been
imposed at the time of conviction.” Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 460, 808 P.2d 373, 379
(1991) (emphasis original).

Thus, in 2013, the district court lawfully imposed a five year

sentence and, under Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.164-67.) At the end
of that period of retained jurisdiction, the court was permitted to “decide whether to place the
defendant on probation or release jurisdiction.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The district court here
determined to do the former, suspending Stroud’s sentence and, in January of 2014, placing him
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on a new period of probation for a period of five years, backdated to July of 2013. (R., pp.17983.)
According to Stroud, it is only this last step that was unlawful. He contends that the
district court could not suspend the five year sentence it imposed in favor of a five year period of
probation because doing so would require Stroud to be on probation for more than five years in
total. 4 That is so, he claims, because the “aggregate” of the five year period of probation ordered
in 2014, after the court suspended his sentence, and the period of probation ordered while he was
on withheld judgment would exceed five years. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The statutory language does not support his view. What Idaho Code §§ 20-222(1) and
19-2601(7) make clear is that the district court may not order any single period of probation that
exceeds the maximum period of confinement, and may not extend any single period of probation
so that it exceeds the maximum period of confinement. They do not say that two distinct periods
of probation―one under a withheld judgment and the other under a later imposed but suspended
sentence, separated by a period of incarceration―should be aggregated so as to be considered a
single “period” of probation. Where a district court revokes probation and enters a judgment, it
may impose any sentence it could have imposed initially, it may suspend that sentence, and the
period of probation ordered in association with the withheld judgment does not count against the
length of the period the court may order in association with the newly pronounced and suspended
sentence.

The district court here ordered two distinct periods of probation, not a single,

temporally disconnected period.

4

He makes this argument notwithstanding the fact that, not surprisingly, his counsel
recommended probation at the jurisdiction review hearing. (R., p.177.)
7

Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended to limit district courts in the
manner that Stroud is suggesting this court was limited. “It is apparent from the broad language
of s. 19-2601 that the legislature intended the courts to have maximum flexibility to fashion the
sentence most appropriate to the individual defendant. The statute therefore must be liberally
construed.” State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 279, 581 P.2d 319, 325 (1978). Following his
probation violation in 2013, the district court imposed a five year sentence but retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.164-67.) “The purpose of the retained jurisdiction procedure is to provide a
period for evaluation of the offender’s potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation.”
Bradford v. State, 124 Idaho 788, 790, 864 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 1993). But, in Stroud’s
view, because he had already been on probation while on a withheld judgment for more than four
years when he violated, the district court’s only options at the end of the period of retained
jurisdiction were to either (1) relinquish its jurisdiction and execute the underlying sentence or
(2) place Stroud on an exceedingly short period of probation. Stroud’s view makes a period of
retained jurisdiction meaningless under this and relevantly similar circumstances because it
deprives the district court of the opportunity to impose a meaningful period of probation after
retaining jurisdiction to evaluate his suitability for probation.
None of the cases cited by Stroud support his position. Stroud relies primarily on State v.
Dunne, 166 Idaho 541, 461 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2020), but that case undermines his position.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) In Dunne, a district court withheld judgment and ordered five years
of probation, which was the maximum period, and then issued an order “reinstating” the
probation for an additional five years after Dunne violated. Dunne, 166 Idaho at ___, 461 P.3d at
824. The Court of Appeals held that the order was an unlawful extension of the existing period
of probation, but emphasized that the district court could have ordered a new period of probation
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if it had revoked Dunne’s probation and entered judgment. Id. at ___, 461 P.3d at 826. “Under
that circumstance, the district court having previously withheld judgment could pronounce any
judgment it could have originally pronounced,” including “up to a five-year sentence, suspended
or imposed (including imposition with a period of retained jurisdiction).” Id. Of course, that is
exactly what happened here. The district court revoked Stroud’s initial period of probation,
entered judgment and imposed a five year sentence, retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence,
and ordered a new five-year period of probation, just as Dunne indicated would be lawful. (R.,
pp.164-67, 179-83.) While Stroud “acknowledges that . . . this case is different [than Dunne] in
that the district court revoked his withheld judgment in 2013,” he does not address the manner in
which, under Dunne, that difference undermines his position.
Next, Stroud cites State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 909 P.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1994).
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) There, the district court withheld judgment and placed Gallipeau on
probation for five years. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho at 2, 909 P.2d at 620. When he violated his
probation, the district court revoked his probation, entered a judgment of conviction, imposed a
sentence, retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence after the period of retained jurisdiction,
and placed Gallipeau on probation for seven years. Id. On appeal, Gallipeau argued, inter alia,
that “the district court was without authority to lengthen the probationary period when it placed
him on probation for the second time . . . after a period of retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 5, 909
P.2d at 623. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument for two, alternative reasons. First, it
noted that when the district court revoked Gallipeau’s probation and entered judgment, “[a]t that
point the court could lawfully impose any sentence that could have been ordered originally” and
“also had authority to retain jurisdiction and thereafter grant Gallipeau a new probationary
period.” Id. (emphasis added). That is, the period of probation ordered after the entry of a
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judgment of conviction and suspension of Gallipeau’s sentence was not a continuation of his
period of probation while judgment was withheld, but was a new period of probation. But,
second, the court also noted that, even if the latter period of probation was considered an
extension of the former, that period would still be less than the maximum term of imprisonment
to which Gallipeau could have been subject on his conviction for grand theft. Id.
Stroud seizes on this latter, alternative holding, claiming that “[t]he difference between
this case and Gallipeau is that Mr. Gallipeau was not on probation [even considering the
aggregate of the two periods of probation] longer than the maximum punishment for his crime.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) While that is a difference between this appeal and Gallipeau―and so
there was an additional reason, not applicable here, to reject Gallipeau’s argument―it does not
change the fact that one of the two alternate bases for rejecting Gallipeau’s argument applies with
equal force to Stroud’s argument here.
Finally, Stroud’s only argument on appeal is “that his term of probation expired on
November 25, 2014, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation in
2018.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) He has therefore waived any other argument. See State v.
Baxter, 163 Idaho 231, 235 n.4, 409 P.3d 811, 815 n.4 (2018) (an argument is waived if not
supported by cogent argument or authority in the opening brief). As discussed above, in January
of 2014 the district court lawfully ordered a new, five year period of probation. (R., pp.179-83.)
It thus had jurisdiction over Stroud when he violated that probation in 2018. Stroud has not
otherwise attacked or challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion, and has not
argued that the district court was otherwise powerless to extend his probation in 2018. Because
Stroud’s only argument on appeal is meritless, this Court should affirm the district court.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the denial of Stroud’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2020.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of September, 2020, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means
of iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
AVW/dd
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